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Does God Have a Body?  
Rāmānuja’s Challenge to the Christian Tradition 
 
Jon Paul Sydnor 
Emmanuel College, Boston 
 
ABSTRACT: The Christian tradition’s core 
theological assertion is the embodiment of 
God in the person of Jesus Christ. Yet, even 
while asserting God’s incarnation in space and 
time, the tradition has usually denied 
embodiment unto the Godhead itself. 
Theologians have based this denial on Jewish 
iconoclasm, Greek idealism, and inferences 
from God’s omnipresence, transcendence, and 
infinity. This speculative essay will argue that 
Hindu Śrīvaiṣṇava theologian Rāmānuja 
successfully addresses these concerns. He 
argues for the embodiment of an omnipresent, 
transcendent, and infinite personal God. 
Rāmānuja largely derives his arguments from 
the Hindu scriptures. Nevertheless, their 
rational explication and internal coherence 
render divine embodiment a legitimate 
theological option for the Christian tradition, 
whose scriptures present both 
anthropomorphic and iconoclastic concepts of 
God. Since Godhead embodiment is 
ontologically coherent and rationally 
defensible, Christians must accept or reject it 
based on axiological grounds, by evaluating 
the felt consequences of the doctrine in 
Christian life. For embodied beings, any 
pastoral theology should commend 
embodiment within the Godhead. 
Hinduism, Christianity, and Godhead 
Embodiment: Continuing a liberal Christian 
trajectory toward divine embodiment. 
The Christian tradition presumes divine 
embodiment, founded as it is on the 
expression of the divine Logos in Jesus Christ 
(John 1). At the same time, the tradition has 
usually denied the possibility of Godhead 
embodiment—the assertion that God in 
Godself possesses a body. This essay will 
tentatively, provisionally, and speculatively 
assert divine embodiment within the Godhead 
itself. Since creation is an expression of the 
overflowing love of God, our created condition 
must be a blessing. Hence, our material 
existence cannot be inferior to any purely 
spiritual existence, nor need we subordinate 
body to soul.  
Biblically, Genesis 1.24-27 defines 
humankind as made in the image of God. The 
Christian tradition has interpreted this text in 
many different ways. Athanasius defines the 
image of God as, at least in part, our ability to 
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reason.1 Augustine, basing his interpretation 
of the image of God on the Trinity, notes that 
psychologically we are three making a whole—
memory, intellect, and will co-operating 
within one person.2 More sympathetic to our 
agenda, Irenaeus insists that the image of God 
includes every part of a human—soul, spirit, 
and body. Hence, to invoke the divine image is 
to integrate all three aspects of our person 
into one experiential unity.3 Like Irenaeus, we 
are now attempting to define the image of God 
in this-worldly, embodied terms. Defined thus, 
creation in the image of God invites us to 
celebrate our condition as personal, local, and 
sentient beings. Indeed, creation in the image 
of God allows us to imagine God in Godself as 
embodied—personal, local, and sentient—
although limitless with regard to this 
universe. 
This consideration of divine embodiment 
continues the trajectory of liberal Christian 
theology which, over the past several decades, 
has adopted reforms that celebrate the human 
condition. For example, most authoritative 
Christian theologians, such as St. Thomas 
Aquinas, deem God to be impassible: without 
passions, free of appetites, and incapable of 
sensation.4 However, many theologians of 
late—feminist, womanist, process, open, et 
al—have reconsidered the doctrine of 
impassibility, describing it as both unbiblical 
and patriarchal. As unbiblical, the doctrine 
ignores numerous biblical texts in which God 
is interactive, emotional, even conversational 
(Exodus 33:11). The Bible ascribes qualities to 
God that imply passability such as compassion 
(Exodus 22:27). God even changes the divine 
mind, when presented with a convincing 
argument (Numbers 14:13-25, Amos 7:3, 6).5 As 
patriarchal, the doctrine of divine 
impassibility suggests a stoical male ideal who 
is personally distant and emotionally 
unavailable. Impassibility celebrates the 
rugged, lone maverick who thrives outside of 
community, who is nonexpressive, 
unemotional, and antisocial. He needs no one.6  
In response to this diagnosis, certain 
theologians, such as Thomas J. Oord, have 
instead argued for the passibility of God—that 
God feels, and feels deeply. God is sympathetic 
to human events, responsive to human cries, 
and personally active in human affairs. God is 
highly involved, as a full person—thinking, 
feeling, talking, and changing.7 This passible 
concept of God implies rejecting another 
traditionally ascribed quality of God, that of 
immutability. This doctrine asserts that God, 
being perfect, cannot change. The universe 
cannot affect this perfectly actual God, who 
transcends the vicissitudes of creatures within 
creation.8 However, as noted above, the 
biblical God changes often. Moreover, if God is 
a divine person, or a community of divine 
persons, and not an abstract ideal, then God 
must be receptive to interpersonal influence. 
Love demands both openness to reality and 
vulnerability to community, so steadfast love 
will produce unceasing change.9 
The divine mutability suggests, by way of 
consequence, the divine temporality. God is 
not atemporal, in some timeless, transcendent 
state. Instead, God is temporal, participating 
in time, open to change to the very core of the 
divine being. To clarify: God as the creator and 
sustainer of our spacetime cannot be limited 
to it—God is not restricted to our temporal 
universe, as it were. But God is open to the 
succession of feelings, events, and emotions 
that relationality affords. God is personal and 
relational, which is to be timeful.10  
Finally, the doctrine of the social Trinity 
has received increased attention over the past 
several decades, led by such theologians as 
Jurgen Moltmann, Catherine Mowry Lacugna, 
John D. Zizioulas, and Leonardo Boff. While the 
concept of God as three persons in 
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communion has perennial expression within 
Christianity, concerns regarding tritheism 
caused the tradition to, at times, emphasize 
the unity of God over the diversity within God. 
The theologians above, on the other hand, 
emphasize interpersonality within the 
Godhead. In their view, God is three always 
becoming one, rather than one with three 
different expressions. The multiplicity of God 
precedes the unicity of God, not temporally, 
but ontologically. Without community, 
without increase-through-relation, God would 
not be.11  
To many Christians, these three 
theological reforms—interpreting God as 
mutable, temporal, and social—are highly 
salutary. They re-articulate the biblical 
assertion that we are made in the image of 
God—for love, relationship, and community. 
And they celebrate the human condition as an 
expression of the divine condition. Now, let us 
consider how the thought of Rāmānuja might 
help us to continue along this liberal Christian 
trajectory and consider divine embodiment, 
even unto the Godhead. (Please note: what 
follows is speculative theology. I believe the 
position taken is worth consideration, but I do 
not assert that it is true.)   
Cosmic embodiment: The universe as the body 
of Nārāyaṇa. 
Rāmānuja’s theology offers several modes 
of divine being. We must distinguish these 
modes of divine being in order to understand 
how they cohere. To begin, Rāmānuja 
proposes a panentheistic, emanationist 
account of divine embodiment, in which 
Nārāyaṇa supports and controls the universe 
of sentient and nonsentient beings. Just as our 
self controls and supports our body, Nārāyaṇa 
controls and supports the universe as his 
body. All souls and bodies, all spirit and 
matter, derive their being from Nārāyaṇa, as 
distinct modes of Nārāyaṇa’s self-expression. 
Nārāyaṇa unifies them through his sustenance 
and diversifies them with real difference.12 
They are, simultaneously, one and many.  
Such panentheism has parallels within the 
Christian tradition, even as Christianity has 
usually rejected emanationism. Emanationism 
is found suspect on several counts. First, in the 
substantialist wording of the traditional 
creeds, only Christ is of one substance 
(homooúsios) with the Father. In order to 
preserve the uniqueness of Christ, the rest of 
the universe must be of a different substance 
from the Father. Since emanationism implies 
the universal sharing of one divine substance, 
substantialist christologies preclude 
emanationism.13 
If the universe must be of a different 
substance from the Father and Son, but is not 
made of pre-existing, recalcitrant matter (as 
in Plato’s Timaeus), then it must have been 
created from nothingness. In other words, the 
Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, or 
creation from nothing, results at least 
partially from substantialist Christology. The 
universe arose by the will of God, but it does 
not derive from the very being of God. It 
derives from elsewhere, from the nihil, which 
God’s gracious will overcomes through 
creative speech. So crucial was creatio ex 
nihilo to the integrity of Christian thought 
that The Fourth Lateran Council declared it 
dogma in 1215 (Constitution I), and the First 
Vatican Council of 1869-1870 anathematized 
all who asserted emanationism (Canon I.3-4). 
The liberal Christian theological tradition 
within which we are speculating has newly 
celebrated vulnerability, participation, and 
dynamism as coordinate with love, hence 
integral to God. Theologians like Friedrich 
Schleiermacher have offered Christologies 
based on agapic phenomenology rather than 
substantialist ontology.14 Since such 
Christologies do not hinge on a substantialist 
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distinction between the Creator and creation, 
we no longer need reject panentheism as 
Christologically incoherent. Instead of being 
unified in substance with the Creator, Christ 
can become the One who is perfectly aware of 
the universe’s source in creative, divine love. 
Through this awareness, Christ imbues 
humanity with the universal, unconditional 
love that is its rightful inheritance.15 
Some process theologians, such as Charles 
Hartshorne, David Ray Griffin, and Marjorie 
Suchocki, have objected that classical theism 
divides the world (matter) from God (spirit), 
rendering the universe profane. As a 
correction, they assert the presence of God 
within the world through a soul-body analogy 
similar to Rāmānuja’s. According to these 
theologians, the soul-body analogy allows us 
to sense God within the universe, while also 
acknowledging that God exceeds the universe. 
The concept articulates our experience of God 
as both immanent and transcendent. It 
ascribes the holiness of the universe to a 
source beyond, thereby celebrating the 
divinity of all reality, while avoiding 
pantheism and championing panentheism.16 
Thus, these Christian theologians offer 
concepts of the God-world relationship 
analogous to Rāmānuja’s. God’s creative, 
sustaining power results in cosmic 
embodiment. The universe is the body of God, 
who includes and exceeds the universe, just as 
we include and exceed our own bodies. 
Personal embodiment: The beautiful, sensible, 
humanlike form of God. 
As we have seen, according to Rāmānuja 
divinity finds embodiment in the universe. 
Rāmānuja’s doctrine of divine embodiment 
could certainly inform Christian panentheism. 
Indeed, Ankur Barua has magisterially utilized 
Rāmānuja to buttress Christian concepts of the 
cosmos as the body of God.17 However, 
Rāmānuja makes another move that is more 
central to our argument for Godhead 
embodiment. In addition to cosmic divine 
embodiment, Rāmānuja also advocates 
personal divine embodiment. In other words, 
Rāmānuja proposes that God possesses a 
divine form (divyarūpa)—a sensible, 
humanlike, embodied expression of divinity 
that is unconditionally ultimate. Crucially, this 
divine form is unified with an essential form 
(svarūpa)—an invisible, omnipresent, 
transcendent aspect. In Rāmānuja’s theistic 
tradition, the abstract, essential form of God 
begs expression in the concrete, personal form 
of God, just as the concrete, personal form 
finds it saving completion in the abstract, 
essential form. Humans need God to be a 
person who is somewhere and a presence who 
is everywhere, so God fulfills both needs. 
Below, I will explicate Rāmānuja’s doctrine of 
the divyarūpa (concrete, personal form) of 
God as I note how it addresses traditional 
Christian objections to Godhead embodiment. 
Since most of the Christian sources in this 
essay are systematic theologians, for my 
explication of Rāmānuja I will primarily rely 
on the Vedārthasaṅgraha, his most systematic 
work of theology.  
A Constructed Hindu-Christian Dialogue 
Christian objections to Godhead embodiment.  
Christian objections to embodiment 
within the Godhead have taken several forms, 
which we will review below. Before we begin, 
we must note that Rāmānuja cannot address 
objections based on Christian scripture. Some 
Christians interpret the commandment 
against making graven images (Exodus 20:4) as 
a declaration of the disembodiment of God. 
More compellingly, John 4:24a declares: “God 
is Spirit”. Conversely, other passages suggest 
the embodiment of God. Genesis 3:8 describes 
God as walking in the Garden of Eden. Jacob 
claims to have seen God face to face (Genesis 
32.30). In Exodus 33:22, God covers Moses’ face 
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with the divine hand in order to protect Moses 
from seeing God. So, even though Rāmānuja 
cannot refute biblical arguments against 
Godhead embodiment, these arguments are 
not themselves conclusive, since the Bible 
offers multiple attitudes toward embodiment. 
In order to avoid the quicksand of scriptural 
polemics, this essay will present theological 
objections to Godhead embodiment, not 
scriptural objections. After presenting each 
theological objection, I will present 
Rāmānuja’s implicit response to it. 
Cumulatively, the responses will provide a 
serviceable introduction to Rāmānuja’s 
doctrine of divine, personal embodiment. 
Objection: The embodied God is an 
anthropomorphic projection. 
If thy predicates are anthropomorphisms, 
the subject of them is an 
anthropomorphism too. If love, goodness, 
personality, &c, are human attributes, so 
also is the subject which thou 
presupposest, the existence of God, the 
belief that there is a God, an 
anthropomorphism - a presupposition 
purely human…Thou believest in love as a 
divine attribute because thou thyself 
lovest; thou believest that God is a wise, 
benevolent being because thou knowest 
nothing better in thyself than 
benevolence and wisdom; and thou 
believest that God exists, and that 
therefore he is a subject…because thou 
existest, art thyself a subject. (Ludwig 
Feuerbach)18  
The German philosopher Ludwig 
Feuerbach most famously asserted that God is 
a projection of the highest human ideals. 
Feuerbach himself insisted that he was not an 
atheist. Nevertheless, his religious humanism 
has occasionally earned him a place among 
Paul Ricoeur’s masters of suspicion: Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Freud. According to Feuerbach, 
predicates constitute a subject. There is no 
subject without qualities. Problematically, 
humans cannot “think” the divine attributes 
as divine attributes. Due to our limited human 
epistemological situation, we can only “think” 
human attributes, then project them onto 
God. Therefore, God can be no more than a 
conglomeration of the best human attributes. 
Theology is epistemologically limited to 
anthropology. Inevitably, to worship God is to 
celebrate the best in humankind. Having 
ascribed the best of our qualities to God, we 
may then infer the existence of God 
underlying those qualities. But that is only 
because we are familiar with our own 
existence, underlying our own (more mixed) 
qualities. In the end, the existence of God is 
but a projection of our own, very human, 
existence.19  
Rāmānuja replies: God is not 
anthropomorphic; humans are theomorphic. 
Rāmānuja’s concept of God maintains a 
profound tension. Rāmānuja defines God’s 
svarūpa, the proper form or essence, as 
infinite, pure, blissful knowledge. This 
definition is abstract and impersonal, in 
accord with the early, nontheistic Upaniṣadic 
tradition. At the same time, Rāmānuja also 
conceptualizes God as possessing a divyarūpa, 
or divine form. This divine form has a 
beautiful, youthful appearance. He is a person 
with a personal name: Nārāyaṇa. This concept 
of the divine accords with the highly personal 
devotion that characterizes Rāmānuja’s own 
Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition. 
Worried about theological literalism, the 
Semitic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam have traditionally been chary, to varying 
degrees, of humanlike depictions or 
conceptions of deity. The academic study of 
religion has come to categorize such 
depictions as “anthropomorphic”. But, from 
the perspective of Rāmānuja, the ascription of 
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a divine form (divyarūpa) to Nārāyaṇa is not 
technically anthropomorphic, since human 
knowledge of Nārāyaṇa’s bodily form is 
scripturally derived rather than humanly 
projected.20 Indeed, Rāmānuja insists on the 
reality of the divine form based on the 
authority of scripture, particularly the 
Brahma Sutras (1.1.21), which claim that 
Brahman (a more generalized term for the 
ultimate, personal God) dwells within the 
Sun.21 Elsewhere, Rāmānuja cites theistic 
Upaniṣads that describe Brahman as wearing a 
saffron-colored garment,22 having the color of 
the sun, and being moon-faced.23 Crucially, 
Nārāyaṇa’s humanlike form ontologically (not 
chronologically) precedes and grounds human 
existence. Therefore, any interpretation of 
Nārāyaṇa as anthropomorphic is mistaken. 
Nārāyaṇa is not anthropomorphic; humans 
are theomorphic. 
Objection: Embodiment would diminish 
God. 
[The most ancient philosophers] all 
posited an infinite first principle of things, 
as though compelled by truth itself. Yet 
they did not recognize their own voice. 
They judged the infinity of the first 
principle in terms of discrete quantity, 
following Democritus, who posited 
infinite atoms as the principles of things, 
and also Anaxagoras, who posited infinite 
similar parts as the principles of things. Or 
they judged infinity in terms of 
continuous quantity, following those who 
posited that the first principle of all things 
was some element or a confused infinite 
body. But, since it was shown by the effort 
of later philosophers that there is no 
infinite body, given that there must be a 
first principle that is in some way infinite, 
we conclude that the infinite which is the 
first principle is neither a body nor a 
power in a body. (St. Thomas Aquinas)24 
Embodiment suggests finitude. A body is 
not infinite, it is finite. A body is not every 
body, it is some body, so it becomes one among 
many, an object among objects. This status 
precludes divinity. God cannot be a supreme 
being among beings, because then God would 
be exceeded by being itself. By way of 
consequence, God must be something more. 
God must be, at least, the ground of being that 
sustains all beings. For this reason, Christian 
theology has generally rejected Godhead 
embodiment.25  
Rāmānuja replies: Embodiment and infinitude 
are compatible; the embodied God remains 
transcendent. 
Writing for his devotional, theistic 
Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition, Rāmānuja seeks to 
preserve the majestic transcendence of 
Nārāyaṇa. Some religious traditions assert 
divine transcendence by adopting apophatic 
interpretations of God, denying to God all 
humanly knowable attributes, in an attempt to 
preserve the wholly other nature of the divine. 
Śaṅkara and his later Advaitin followers 
utilized this approach, arguing that Brahman 
is ultimately nirguṇa, without qualities, but 
may be conceptualized as saguṇa, with 
qualities, by those less advanced on the path 
to enlightenment.26 
Rāmānuja, on the other hand, 
categorically rejects nirguṇa, apophatic 
approaches to understanding God. Yet his 
saguṇa, cataphatic approach, which ascribes 
real qualities to God, risks rendering the 
divine comprehensible or mundane. If we use 
language to describe God, and assert that the 
language is in some way true, then the infinite 
God may become bound within our finite 
language. Thus, the transcendence of God 
would be lost to the linguistic description of 
God. We seem to be caught in a theological 
vise: either we can describe God (the 
cataphatic approach) and render God finite, or 
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we can leave God a contentless mystery (the 
apophatic approach) and preserve God’s 
infinity.  
Rāmānuja navigates this Scylla and 
Charybdis of theology through the practice of 
transcataphatic theism. That is, he uses 
language to describe God, and asserts that his 
language reveals something true about God. 
But the positive attributes ascribed to God are 
themselves infinite, as befitting an infinite 
God. Hence, his approach unites divine 
transcendence with cataphatic theology—it is 
transcataphatic. In other words, Rāmānuja’s 
concept of God has positive content yet 
exceeds human understanding. 
Metaphorically, Rāmānuja describes Nārāyaṇa 
as an ocean of auspicious qualities, possessing 
excellences beyond comprehension. In this 
way, Rāmānuja transfers the immensity of the 
ocean to the person of Nārāyaṇa, leaving him 
as unfathomable as the depths of the sea.27 The 
sheer infinity of Nārāyaṇa’s attributes, and 
Nārāyaṇa’s capacity to bear this infinity of 
attributes, establishes Nārāyaṇa’s eclipse of all 
human thought. He is always more than what 
we have said, so his being remains within 
sublime mystery. By adopting transcataphatic 
theism, Rāmānuja preserves the beauty, 
personality, and transcendence of the divine, 
yet rejects the impersonal transcendence that 
characterizes Advaitin apophatic (nirguṇa) 
transtheism. Nārāyaṇa is a loving divinity 
rather than an indifferent absolute, a 
relational personality rather than pure 
consciousness. 
Objection: Divine embodiment suggests 
limited locality rather than unlimited 
omnipresence. 
On account of His greatness [God] is 
ranked as the All, and is the Father of the 
universe. Nor are any parts to be 
predicated of Him…For the One is 
indivisible; wherefore also it is infinite, 
not considered with reference to 
inscrutability, but with reference to its 
being without dimensions, and not having 
a limit. And therefore it is without form 
and name. (Clement of Alexandria)28 
If an embodied God were everywhere, 
then those parts constituting God’s body 
would mix with the parts constituting the 
universe. God would be divided and jumbled. 
In order to avoid this confusion, we could 
assert that God is somewhere, not everywhere. 
But then God would be limited in space. God 
would be there instead of here, or here instead 
of there. As sinners, we could hide from God. 
As sufferers, we could find ourselves outside 
God’s grace. But scripture, tradition, reason, 
and experience all attest that God is uniformly 
and absolutely present throughout our lives, 
both in time and space, undiluted and 
undivided. God is perfectly God, everywhere. 
Therefore, God cannot be embodied. God must 
be spirit—infinite, invisible presence.29  
Rāmānuja replies: Embodiment and ubiquity 
are reconciled in Nārāyaṇa.  
Rāmānuja provides a coherent account of 
the embodiment and ubiquity of Nārāyaṇa. In 
his doctrine of the ātman (the soul; here, the 
personal soul), Rāmānuja asserts that the 
ātman is both aṇu (atomic, localizable) and 
vibhū (pervasive within the body). Just as a 
sandalwood object scents a room with the 
fragrance of sandalwood, so an atomic soul 
pervades a body with sentience. Similarly, we 
can conceptualize Nārāyaṇa as aṇu, localizable 
within his heavenly abode of Vaikuṇṭha, in the 
presence of his consort Śrī. At the same time, 
we can conceptualize Nārāyaṇa as vibhū, 
pervasive within all that exists as the ground 
of being. In this way, Nārāyaṇa becomes a 
person who is somewhere (Nārāyaṇa in 
Vaikuṇṭha) and a substance that is 
everywhere (jñāna, or wisdom, as the 
underlying substrate of reality). In this way, 
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Rāmānuja unites the strengths of theism and 
transtheism in one personal, omnipresent 
deity.30 
Objection: An omnipresent body would 
displace all other bodies. 
How can the principle be maintained, that 
God permeates and fills all things, as 
Scripture says, “Do not I fill Heaven and 
Earth, saith the Lord?” [Jeremiah 23.24]. 
For it is impossible to permeate and be 
permeated by others without dividing and 
being divided, without being blended and 
contrasted, just as when a number of 
liquids are mixed together and blended. 
(St. John of Damascus)31 
Two bodies cannot occupy the same space. 
They displace one another. That’s why billiard 
balls move other billiard balls and couples 
sharing a bed fight for territory. If God is 
omnipresent and has a body, then God would 
displace all other bodies. Quite simply, no 
other bodies could exist besides God’s. 
Therefore, God cannot have a body.32 
Rāmānuja replies: The Śrīvaiṣṇava doctrine of 
dreaming creation resolves the contest 
between bodies. 
Rāmānuja’s tradition provides a visual 
reconciliation of the divine embodiedness and 
omnipresence, in the figure of Viṣṇu dreaming 
the universe into being. To this image of Viṣṇu 
Rāmānuja dedicates his Vedārthasaṅgraha: “I 
offer adoration to Vishnu, the all-pervading 
Supreme Being, who is the overlord of all 
sentient and non-sentient entities, who 
reposes on the primordial Shesa, who is pure 
and infinite and in whom abound blissful 
perfections.”33 In this image, Viṣṇu is in 
Vaikuṇṭha where he reclines on the cosmic 
serpent Śeṣa, generating our own universe by 
the power of his imaginative dreaming. But 
Viṣṇu’s dreaming is not like our dreaming—it 
is free, aware, and purposeful, directed by 
Viṣṇu. It is the means of Viṣṇu’s creation, not 
an accident of his subconscious. As the 
occupants of Viṣṇu’s magic, we occupy the 
mind of God, which pervades our universe 
even as Viṣṇu resides locally in heaven.  
Our own experience of dreaming 
illustrates the spatial elasticity of 
embodiment. When we dream, our dreaming 
body is somewhere. But in our dream, our 
dreamed body is somewhere else. We are two 
places at once, as both dreamer and dreamed. 
All the other bodies in our dream exist, 
alongside our dreamed body, in spatial 
relation to our dreamed body, within our 
dreaming mind. That is, they are spatially 
related to one another in the dream, but not 
spatially related to the dreaming mind, being 
unaware of their invisible sustainer. God, like 
any dreamer, can be embodied and pervade 
bodies, just as we are embodied and our mind 
pervades the bodies within our dream.  
 
Figure 1: Viṣṇu Dreaming (Credit: Wikicommons) 
Objection: Embodiment limits to a place, 
hence limits our knowledge to a 
perspective. 
Intellectual knowledge, moreover, is more 
certain than sensitive knowledge. In 
nature we find an object for the sense and 
therefore for the intellect as well. But the 
order and distinction of powers is 
according to the order of objects. 
Therefore, above all sensible things there 
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is something intelligible among things. 
Now, every body having actual existence 
is sensible. Therefore, we can find 
something nobler above all bodies. Hence, 
if God is a body, He will not be the first and 
greatest being. (St. Thomas Aquinas)34 
Aquinas argues that if God is embodied, 
then God would be something that we know 
sensibly rather than intellectually. But 
sensible knowledge changes; it can be 
distorted by perspective, lost to memory, 
influenced by prejudice. Intellectual 
knowledge, such as mathematical truth, is 
higher, purer, more universal, and more 
reliable than sensible knowledge. Hence, God 
must be something or someone we know 
intellectually; God must be disembodied like 
mathematics, not embodied like a landscape 
(Aquinas, §20, 6).  
Rāmānuja is not working within Aquinas’ 
Platonic hierarchy of being. As we saw above 
in our section on the cosmic embodiment of 
Nārāyaṇa, for Rāmānuja both material nature 
and intellectual truth are fully divine, since 
both are solely from God. One cannot be 
ranked over the other, as God cannot be 
ranked over God (Rāmānuja, §12, 15). For this 
reason, sensible experience is as true and real 
as intellectual experience. Both sensibility and 
intellectuality are gifts of God, sustained by 
God, and to be trusted—like God.   
Related to the objection from locality, the 
possession of a body suggests limitation to a 
perspective. If we depend on our senses for 
knowledge, then our knowledge will be local. 
But if we rely on our intellect for knowledge, 
then our knowledge will be universal. Classical 
theism defines God as omniscient, knowing all 
things from everywhere. Since embodied 
beings can only know some things from 
somewhere, God cannot be embodied. In other 
words, God’s knowing cannot be limited, 
subjective, and situated. It must be 
transcendent, objective, and universal.35  
Rāmānuja replies: Nārāyaṇa is an embodied 
person who knows, but Nārāyaṇa is also 
knowledge itself. 
The proper form (svarūpa) of 
Brahman/Nārāyaṇa, consisting of infinite, 
pure, blissful knowledge, is not an abstraction 
that one can solely meditate upon, nor is it a 
mode of being with which one attempts to 
achieve identity. In other words, it is not the 
nirguṇa Brahman of monistic Advaita.36  In the 
end, perfectly blissful knowledge is the proper 
form of Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Person 
(Puruṣotamma) and the sole object of 
Śrīvaiṣṇava devotion.37 Of the svarūpa’s 
attributes, two are defining: knowledge in the 
form of bliss (ānandarūpajñānam), and 
opposition to all impurity (malapratyanīka). 
These defining attributes (dharmas) are 
fundamental to all auspicious attributes 
(kalyāṇaguṇas). Indeed, dharma suggests 
establishing or supporting,38 implying that the 
defining attributes serve as a ground for the 
auspicious attributes. Nevertheless, even 
these defining attributes are but attributes 
(guṇas). They characterize the proper form of 
Brahman, but are not that proper form 
(svarūpa).39 Nārāyaṇa, then, presents with 
form and without form, and offers all the 
benefits of Personalist devotion as well as 
Idealist meditation. According to Rāmānuja, 
we don’t have to choose. Nārāyaṇa is an ocean 
of auspicious attributes, even those that our 
limited logic might define as opposing.  
Objection: Embodiment subordinates God 
to time. 
Our God did not begin to be in time: He 
alone is without beginning, and He is the 
beginning of all things. God is a Spirit, not 
pervading matter, but the Maker of 
material spirits; and of the forms that are 
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in matter; He is invisible, impalpable, 
being Himself the Father of both sensible 
and invisible things. (Tatian the Syrian)40 
Divine embodiment suggests temporality 
rather than eternality, timefulness instead of 
timelessness. As noted above, for classical 
Christian theologians, God’s perfection—God’s 
perfect actuality, devoid of any potentiality—
precludes change. But a body that does not 
change, a body outside of time, would be a 
statue, and a lifeless statue cannot symbolize a 
living God. The ascription of timelessness to 
God necessitates the disembodiment of God, or 
else God becomes frozen.41 (The liberal 
theological trajectory within which we are 
speculating is much less suspicious of divine 
participation in time and/or divine change. 
Nevertheless, we include this objection and 
response for the sake of thoroughness.) 
Rāmānuja replies: Nārāyaṇa is not subject to 
time as we know it. 
For Rāmānuja, Nārāyaṇa as embodied is 
also Nārāyaṇa as eternal, transcending our 
entropic temporality. Hence, divine 
embodiment, and its connotation of change 
through relation, need not limit God to time as 
we know it. Rāmānuja explicitly states that 
Nārāyaṇa is beyond the changes (pariṇāma) 
that occur within time (kāla).42 More 
explicitly, time is dependent upon Nārāyaṇa 
for its existence, as is all that exists that is not 
Nārāyaṇa. Therefore, he is not under the 
dominion of time. Rather, time is under the 
dominion of Nārāyaṇa.43 Nārāyaṇa, who is 
perfectly free of all impurity, does not know 
decay, or karma, or vice, or suffering, or any of 
the other negative qualities that pervade our 
temporal universe.  
Since Nārāyaṇa is beyond the changes 
(pariṇāma) inherent in time, Nārāyaṇa is also 
beyond the cause and effect experienced 
within saṃsāra. So, he is not subject to the 
reciprocal interactions of everyday existence. 
Instead, he grounds that cause and effect as 
the substantial and efficient cause of all that is. 
He is both the marble and the sculptor, as it 
were. For this reason, Nārāyaṇa is denoted as 
the śeṣa (Preserver, Sustainer, Principal) of the 
śeṣin (Preserved, Sustained, Accessory), or the 
prakārin (mode-possessor) of the prakāra 
(mode).  
Objection: The incarnation of God in 
Christ renders Godhead embodiment 
redundant. 
The Lord did not come to make a display. 
He came to heal and to teach suffering 
men. For one who wanted to make a 
display the thing would have been just to 
appear and dazzle the beholders. But for 
Him Who came to heal and to teach the 
way was not merely to dwell here, but to 
put Himself at the disposal of those who 
needed Him, and to be manifested 
according as they could bear it. 
(Athanasius of Alexandria)44 
The Christian tradition asserts the 
embodiment of God in Jesus of Nazareth. This 
divine embodiment ratifies creation as the 
good handiwork of the Creator. Materiality 
and temporality are the twin blessings of our 
divinely intended life, a life that God 
celebrates through participation. Because 
Christian theology already asserts the divine 
embodiment in Jesus Christ, we need not 
assert embodiment within the Godhead itself. 
Such an assertion provides no added value and 
creates unnecessary theological problems.  
Rāmānuja replies: This-worldly incarnation 
and heavenly incarnation are both necessary. 
Rāmānuja powerfully addresses the above 
criticism by drawing clear distinctions 
between human and divine embodiment in 
relation to time. As noted above, the divine 
form (divyarūpa) is not subject to the 
vicissitudes of time (kāla or muhūrta).45 Time, 
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conceptualized as a substance devoid of guṇas 
(qualities) and coordinate with prakṛti,46 does 
not affect Nārāyaṇa who, even as form, is 
unchanging.47 Because Nārāyaṇa is beyond the 
influence of time, Nārāyaṇa’s divine form is 
eternal. That is, Nārāyaṇa does not 
temporarily assume form within time for the 
benefit of worshippers, nor is Nārāyaṇa’s form 
a mere illusion created for their devotional 
meditations. Instead, any temporal 
manifestation of Nārāyaṇa is a manifestation 
of the real, eternal form of Nārāyaṇa.48 The 
divine form may be individualized specifically 
for the meditative benefit of devotees, but that 
individualization remains a projection of the 
real, eternal form that exists prior to any 
devotional need.49  
The form that Nārāyaṇa assumes 
explicitly for the benefit of the world is the 
form of the avatāra (descent), earthly 
manifestations of Viṣṇu that increase his 
accessibility to earthly devotees and restore 
the earthly dharma.50  But the avatāra is not 
the divine form per se. It is instead a temporal 
descent of the eternal divine form for 
expressly temporal purposes. The divine form 
itself remains in Vaikuṇṭha, the heavenly 
abode, transcendent of entropic, prakṛtic time 
as we know it.  
Objection: Assertion of divine 
embodiment reduces divinity to 
materiality. 
Matter is in potentiality. But we have 
shown (I: 2:3) that God is pure act, without 
any potentiality. Hence it is impossible 
that God should be composed of matter 
and form. (St. Thomas Aquinas)51 
In the classical world, Greco-Roman 
Idealism—Platonism, Plotinianism, Stoicism, 
etc.—rejected anthropomorphic gods and 
their accompanying imagery as illiterate 
superstition. Fearing that material gods 
produced materialistic worshipers, they 
substituted such abstract concepts as the 
Good, the One, or the Logos for the personal 
gods of the masses.52 Articulating Christian 
faith within Hellenistic culture, Christian 
intellectual elites frequently endorsed 
iconoclasm (the rejection of divine imagery), 
even while the popular tradition remained 
iconodulic (enthusiastically utilizing divine 
imagery). The elites suspected that 
embodiment connoted entanglement with 
matter. God, as the perfectly actual creator of 
matter and the natural laws that govern it, 
could not be limited by or subject to His own 
potential-laden creation. God must be spirit. 
Rāmānuja replies: Nārāyaṇa’s body is not 
constituted by the same matter that 
constitutes us. 
Nārāyaṇa’s divine form is aprakṛtic, or 
free of any taint by that profane psychokarmic 
complex that Śrīvaiṣṇavas call prakṛti. While 
it has an appearance, it is supersensory and 
visible only to the inner eye of the mind.53 This 
is a body, but it is not a material body. Here, 
Rāmānuja is influenced by Muṇḍāka Upaniṣad 
3.1.8, which he quotes in part and we supply in 
whole: 
Not by sight, not by speech, nor by any 
other sense; 
nor by austerities or rites is he 
grasped.  
Rather the partless one is seen by a man, 
as he meditates,  
 when his being has become pure,  
 through the lucidity of knowledge.54 
We must note that just as Nārāyaṇa’s body is 
aprakṛtic it is also free from karma and 
voluntarily chosen. Jīvas (individual souls), on 
the other hand, involuntarily receive bodies 
(human or otherwise) appropriate to their 
karmic destiny. They then live out their lives 
within that body subject to the bonds of karma 
and bound to the pleasures and pains of 
saṃsāric existence. So, Nārāyaṇa’s aprakṛtic 
11
Sydnor: Does God Have a Body? R?m?nuja’s Challenge to the Christian Tradi
Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 2018
Does God Have a Body? Rāmānuja’s Challenge to the Christian Tradition 29 
body is necessarily an akarmic body. Nārāyaṇa 
is embodied because he is omnipotent and has 
chosen to become embodied.55 
Nārāyaṇa’s omnipotence; Nārāyaṇa’s 
transcendence. 
While reconciling Nārāyaṇa’s role as both 
material and efficient cause of the universe, 
Rāmānuja notes that reason cannot restrict 
the power of God. By mundane standards, 
material and efficient causality are mutually 
exclusive—the marble does not carve itself 
into a statue. But by divine standards material 
and efficient causality are reconcilable within 
one entity. Indeed, Nārāyaṇa unites material 
and efficient causality through the divine 
omnipotence (sarvaśakti)—creating, 
sustaining, and forming the universe and all 
beings within it.56  
Throughout Rāmānuja’s arguments above 
is an underlying conviction that exclusivist 
logic does not bind Nārāyaṇa. We humans 
cannot be here and there, located body and 
omnipresent spirit, but Nārāyaṇa can. For 
Rāmānuja, Nārāyaṇa is so exalted that the 
accusation of divine contradiction is 
incomprehensible. Rational law, created and 
sustained by Nārāyaṇa, cannot restrict the 
overflowing grace of Nārāyaṇa, who chooses 
to be both embodied and omnipresent, for us. 
By way of consequence, we should dismiss the 
charge of divine contradiction as a human 
attempt to limit the divine freedom.  
God is equally embodied and formless, 
accessible and transcendent. That is, 
according to Rāmānuja as he interprets 
Śrīvaiṣṇava scripture, God is characterized by 
both form (a located aspect that is somewhere) 
and formlessness (an omnipresent aspect that 
is everywhere). Yet, neither of these aspects is 
subordinate or ancillary to the other. Rather, 
they are equally real, equally legitimate, and 
equally proper to Nārāyaṇa. In fact, when 
introducing the divine, embodied form 
(divyarūpa) in relationship to the divine 
formlessness (svarūpa), Rāmānuja states that 
it is tadvad eva, or “just like that”. Rāmānuja 
then goes on to state that “this divine form is 
of Brahman’s essential way of being” 
[divyarūpam api svabhāvikam asti]. In other 
words, Nārāyaṇa with form is not penultimate 
to Nārāyaṇa without form; they are two 
manifestations of one, ultimate unity.57 
Nārāyaṇa’s beauty attracts, while 
Nārāyaṇa’s pure, blissful knowledge provides 
a goal of human spiritual becoming. 
Nārāyaṇa’s personality begets love, while 
Nārāyaṇa’s svarūpa engenders meditation. 
The devotee thus seeks both the transcendent 
(insofar as Nārāyaṇa retains a humanlike form 
in Vaikuṇṭha), and the immanent (insofar as 
Nārāyaṇa’s pure, blissful jñāna (wisdom) 
remains the infinite ground of the finite jīva’s 
[individual soul’s] being). Through worshiping 
Nārāyaṇa who is in Vaikuṇṭha, the devotee 
become paradoxically aware of the 
omnipresence of divinity. Through reception 
of Nārāyaṇa’s grace, the devotee is purified 
into his or her true self. According to 
Rāmānuja, for the devotees of Nārāyaṇa the 
transcendent is immanent, ecstasis is enstasis, 
love is wisdom, and beauty is bliss. There is no 
longer any need to choose between devotion 
and meditation. All has been reconciled in the 
divine person, Nārāyaṇa, who offers all 
manner of salvation.  
Godhead embodiment and the Christian 
tradition: A metaphor too far?  
Proposing the embodiment of God, unto 
the Godhead, may draw criticism as an 
excessive anthropomorphism. Some 
theologians, insisting that God is wholly other, 
might complain that embodiment risks too 
much and brings God too low. Ideally, 
theological metaphors point to a reality they 
cannot reach. The metaphors of personhood, 
vulnerability, and participation may suggest 
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an involved God, but do not necessitate 
embodiment. Instead, our critics might argue, 
the concept of embodiment unnecessarily 
lowers God into our analogies, reducing the 
divine to human comprehension and 
eradicating any sense of mystery.  
For these reasons, the Christian 
theological tradition has generally rejected 
Godhead embodiment. However, in the 
thought of Rāmānuja we find a highly 
sophisticated theology that enthusiastically 
endorses embodiment. Indeed, Rāmānuja 
anticipates and responds to Christian 
theological (not biblical) arguments against 
embodiment. The rationality of his theology 
challenges these Christian arguments, even as 
they derive from the sources and methods of 
the Hindu Vedānta tradition. Given 
Rāmānuja’s success in addressing theological 
arguments against embodiment, constructive 
theologians must evaluate embodiment on 
axiological, not ontological, grounds. In other 
words, we must consider the consequences of 
the doctrine, its resonance with felt human 
existence, how it would play out in 
communitarian life, the ethics it would 
commend, and the future it would hope for. 
Below, I will argue (speculatively) for Godhead 
embodiment in the Christian tradition. These 
arguments will utilize and adapt the theology 
of Rāmānuja for the Christian tradition. 
Embodiment fulfills the tripersonal Godhead. 
Recent doctrines of divine vulnerability, 
affectivity, relationality, and mutability beg 
completion through divine embodiment. 
Embodiment dovetails with personality. In the 
Latin etymology of the word “person,” a 
“person” was a dramatic mask, that which an 
actor would “sound through” (personare). The 
mask was a concrete expression of the 
character’s abstract values, dispositions, and 
habits—of their personality. Personality 
suggests relatedness, and relatedness suggests 
embodiment. Certainly, God’s embodiment 
differs from our embodiment. Nevertheless, to 
be truly distinct, to truly experience increase-
through-relation, the divine persons would 
benefit from bodies through which their 
selves sound. If the Trinitarian Godhead is a 
tripersonal community of joy, then it requires 
differentiated centers of identity through 
which that joy can flow. It requires bodies, 
because bodies facilitate locatedness and 
difference, everything that makes relatedness 
meaningful. 
Idealism is not more sophisticated than 
personalism. 
In the history of religious interactions, 
Idealist religions frequently condescend to 
Personalist religions. In the West, for example, 
contemplative Platonism, Plotinianism, and 
Stoicism looked down on popular theism. 
Likewise, Rāmānuja’s primary opponents were 
the transtheistic, meditative Advaitins, who 
prioritized nirguṇa (attributeless) Brahman 
over saguṇa (attributed) Brahman. Indeed, 
Rāmānuja’s theological vocation was to 
inspire devotional, Śrīvaiṣṇava Tamils as they 
confronted meditative, Advaitin elitism.  
A powerful Advaitin condemnation of 
devotional theology may be found in Śaṅkara’s 
commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad: 
He, one who is not a knower of Brahman, 
who worships another god, a god different 
from himself, approaches him in a 
subordinate position, offering him praises, 
salutations, sacrifices, presents, devotion, 
meditation, etc., thinking, “He is one, non-
self, different from me, and I am another, 
qualified for rites, and I must serve him 
like a debtor”—worships him with such 
ideas, does not know the truth. He, this 
ignorant man, has not only the evil of 
ignorance, but is also like an animal to the 
gods. As a cow or other animals are 
utilized through their services such as 
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carrying loads or yielding milk, so is this 
man of use to every one of the gods and 
others on account of his many services 
such as the performance of sacrifices. That 
is to say, he is therefore engaged to do all 
kinds of services for them.58 
Śaṅkara then goes on to assert that these gods, 
being pleased by the service of their devotees, 
would not want the devotees to achieve mokṣa 
(realization, release), since this release would 
end the devotees’ service toward the gods. Just 
as a human becomes distressed at losing a 
valued animal, so the gods become distressed 
at losing a valued servant. Therefore, the gods 
attempt to keep many humans in bondage by 
convincing them of the difference between 
gods and humans when in fact, all that is, is 
Brahman. 
Advancing his own theistic Śrīvaiṣṇavism, 
Rāmānuja counters the Advaitins by insisting 
that Brahman as Nārāyaṇa (the personal name 
of God) is an ocean of auspicious attributes 
even as his proper form is pure, blissful 
knowledge. In this way Rāmānuja reconciles 
Tamil devotionalism with the Upaniṣadic 
emphasis on the ultimacy of wisdom (jñāna). 
But in achieving this reconciliation, Rāmānuja 
makes the weighty decision to emphasize 
Nārāyaṇa’s differentiation over against his 
unity. This emphasis establishes as real and 
ultimate all attributes associated with 
Nārāyaṇa, including those more closely 
associated with the embodied, highly personal 
divine form (divyarūpa).  
Pastoral benefits of the both/and God. 
Rāmānuja’s reconciliation of divine 
transcendence and divine embodiment has 
important ecclesiastical implications. By 
adopting and adapting Rāmānuja’s theology, 
Christians can marry personal attributes to 
transcendent attributes in a seamless 
synthesis who is intimately accessible yet 
utterly majestic. And this marriage need not 
be forced—form and formlessness are not 
competing aspects of the divine person; they 
are complementary qualities that manifest 
God’s superabundance. Biblically, based on the 
doctrine of imago dei in Genesis One, 
Christians can propose divine embodiment, 
confident that they are not projecting human 
identity onto God, but respecting God’s own 
gracious creation of humankind in the divine, 
personal image. Rāmānuja’s triumph can 
inspire Christians, empowering them to 
celebrate the human situation through the 
doctrine of Godhead embodiment.    
In the end, the most important fact 
regarding the svarūpa and divyarūpa of 
Nārāyaṇa is the simultaneous existence of 
each within Rāmānuja’s Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition. 
His ascription of two distinct manifestations 
to one ultimate Nārāyaṇa grants the tradition 
both spiritual comprehensiveness and cultic 
elasticity. With regard to spiritual 
comprehensiveness, in Nārāyaṇa the 
Śrīvaiṣṇava devotee finds the Infinite Absolute 
of Upaniṣadic meditation married to the 
personal God of Śrīvaiṣṇava devotionalism. 
With regard to cultic elasticity, the 
Śrīvaiṣṇavas are now justified in practicing 
both the ecstatic, relational worship of their 
own saints (the Alvars), as well as the enstatic, 
nondual meditation suggested by the early 
Upaniṣads. In other words, the divyarūpa and 
svarūpa of Nārāyaṇa represent a synthesis of 
traditions generally considered exclusive, 
creating a spacious tradition within which 
different religious personalities could find a 
home.  
Christians considering Godhead 
embodiment should experience the idea as 
opportunity, not threat. We all of us are 
embodied souls or ensouled bodies. We are 
both qualified (bearing difference, viśiṣṭa) and 
nondual (perfectly unified, advaita). We are 
viśiṣṭādvaita, synthesizing spirit and matter 
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into diversified, unified experience. To 
privilege spirit over matter or matter over 
spirit rejects the interwoven, inseparable 
nature of reality as God intended it. Out of 
love, God has joined our souls to bodies, so that 
spirit might experience differentiation and 
perspective. This differentiation and 
perspective grants uniqueness to each 
member of the community, allowing them to 
make a singular contribution, rendering their 
uniqueness vital. Collectively, each 
individual’s difference helps the group. By 
opening ourselves up to the vision of all 
members, we can achieve a dynamic interplay 
of viewpoints that quickens our knowing. We 
can know more as individuals uniting than we 
ever could as individuals separated, or even as 
one universal mind. To paraphrase Paul, we 
can know more as an ecclesia (1 Corinthians 
12:12-20).   
We should not separate what God has 
joined. God invites us to celebrate our dual 
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